Egypt imports sand at prices of up to $480 per ton, despite the endless sands of the Sahara, because desert sand is unsuitable for glass production—silicate sand is required. Iran, under sanctions for 45 years, has developed technological autonomy and exports IT solutions to over 40 countries. These paradoxes reflect not random anomalies, but structural changes in the MENA region. An alternative economic architecture is forming here, with new rules, institutions, and spheres of influence in a market of 500 million people. Understanding the internal logic of these processes is key to solving practical business challenges.

Formation of Post-Western Architecture
Within Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems analysis framework, the MENA region demonstrates a classic transition from a dependent peripheral status to the formation of independent regional centers of influence in the era of macro-regions. MENA countries are transforming from recipients into nodal points of new global flows, exploiting the period of ‘chaos of power’ (the weakening of American hegemonic influence). Those who have learned to operate effectively under conditions of instability gain maximum advantages in forming new economic connections.

Confirmation of the shift in accumulation centers comes from the cardinal change in investment structure: Arab sovereign wealth funds (PIF, ADIA, Mubadala) have become dominant players in key regional deals, displacing Western capital. The Bank for International Settlements confirms this trend—financial flows have shifted from Western to regional capital. To translate from diplomatic language, regional governments prefer neighbors to former metropolis.

These processes manifest most clearly in regional countries that are actively exploiting the period of ‘chaos of power’ to change their status in the world system. While the UAE and Saudi Arabia use instability to strengthen their positions within the existing system, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey have developed their own mechanism for overcoming dependence on Western decision-making centers, creating alternative rules of the game for regional and international interaction.

Egypt: When Generals Outperform Goldman Sachs
Egypt demonstrates a classic example of semi-periphery adaptation to world-system transformations in the era of ‘chaos of power’—when Western influence weakens and new regional alliances are still forming. The country exploits this transition by betting on transit advantages, demographic potential, and institutional flexibility for integration into the emerging system of economic connections.

The foundation for attracting investment here is social stability. Subsidized food for 70 million Egyptians serves as insurance against social explosions amid economic transformations. The Suez Canal, controlling 10-12% of world trade, traditionally brought over $7 billion annually to the budget; however, the Gaza conflict exposed the fragility of this asset: canal revenues collapsed by 60% in 2024, depriving the country of critically important resources. Meanwhile, a market of 114 million consumers, which could grow to 140+ million by 2030, guarantees preservation of long-term demand.
The currency crisis in Egypt became an instrument for a rapid change in its position within the world-system. The pound's collapse from 31 EGP/USD in 2022 to peak levels of 60 EGP/USD in 2023, currently around ~50 EGP/USD, devalued national assets by almost half, turning an internal crisis into a powerful magnet for regional capital. The result was large-scale asset acquisition: the UAE directed $35 billion to develop the ‘Ras al-Hikma’ project, obtaining rights to develop the best sections of Mediterranean coastline (equivalent to one and a half times Jordan's GDP). Investments were joined by Saudi PIF ($5 billion), China ($8 billion), Qatar Energy ($5 billion in the oil and gas sector), and Russia is implementing the El Dabaa nuclear power plant for $25 billion.
The flip side of this strategy was the blockade of profit repatriation: Central Bank currency restrictions paralyzed fund withdrawals; even major international corporations wait months for the opportunity to receive earned money.

The state machine demonstrates critical inefficiency. For example, company registration can take up to 15 weeks, compared to 1-2 weeks in the UAE. As one major Egyptian businessman aptly noted: "I don't know anyone who retained their mental health after interacting with local bureaucracy." Even China's CSCEC, which is building the New Administrative Capital's Central Business District for $3.8 billion, has noted difficulties in logistics and licensing.

In response to this institutional paralysis, military-administrative structures transformed into an alternative economic management mechanism. The military received the right to implement strategic projects through direct presidential orders, bypassing parliamentary procedures—this is exactly how the new Suez Canal channel and the administrative capital were built. Military corporations de facto, operate in a preferential regime: they are exempt from taxes, receive accelerated land allocation, and are guaranteed state contracts without tenders. While civilian ministries get bogged down in procedures, military corporations demonstrate revenue growth of 20-40%, manage 2,800 projects with a total value of 1.1 trillion pounds, and are preparing IPOs for five companies in 2025. Their growing efficiency directly translates into influence: since 2024, the military has received the right to replace police and civilian courts in cases of "threats to public needs." This institutional duality creates fundamentally new risks for business. Investors often do not understand which system to appeal to, and the criteria for "public threats" remain legislatively vague.
Institutional transformation is complemented by the restructuring of financial mechanisms. Egypt has joined BRICS, is negotiating with the EAEU, and is actively developing settlements in national currencies. Simultaneously, cryptocurrency turnover is projected to reach $690 million by 2025, as Egyptians increasingly use digital assets to bypass banking restrictions on conversion, thereby forming alternative financial flows circumvent the traditional dollar system.

Iran: Ayatollahs as Venture Capitalists
Iran demonstrates a unique example of how half a century of isolation can stimulate competitiveness. The sanctions regime, lasting 45 years, forced the country to create a closed technological cycle—from design to final production. The result was technological sovereignty and export of solutions to over 40 countries despite nominal blockade.

The IT sector, developing under conditions of sanctions, demonstrates impressive dynamics and has become one of the few growing economic segments. Annual technology export growth reached 110%, and the total volume of technological product supplies exceeded one billion dollars. Solutions developed in Iran for banking, telecom, and government management are successfully adapted in countries with similar constraints. Key export destinations—namely Iraq, Turkey, India, China, and Syria—account for 60% of total volume. The high level of defense industry development, with technologies created over decades under blockade conditions, was clearly demonstrated during recent events in the conflict with Israel.

Another adaptation mechanism has been rigid institutional concentration. The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) controls between 15% to 30% of the economy through a portfolio of over 220 companies. This asset concentration creates, on one hand, convenient entry points for partners, but on the other hand, it forms dependence on the decisions of a narrow circle of people. The IRGC has its own financial and economic infrastructure—banks, insurance companies, telecommunications networks—forming a parallel economy that effectively bypasses Western restrictions, though it increases operational costs for external partners.

Working with Iran requires a deep adaptation of business processes. The absence of direct banking channels with the West increases transaction costs by 10% and seriously complicates payment logistics. Partners must simultaneously interact with both official ministries and IRGC structures, which requires a clear understanding of the internal logic of authority distribution between these power centers.

The created technological autonomy opens unique opportunities for partners. Integration with Russia's SPFS provides access to tested international settlement schemes. Crypto turnover ($4.18 billion) is used not only to bypass sanctions, but as an instrument for exporting technologies to friendly jurisdictions.
The paradox of the Iranian model lies in the following: the stronger the external pressure, the more inventive the internal solutions. Iran created a technological sovereignty model functioning independently of external circumstances.

Turkey: Military Presence as a Business Model
In conditions of destroyed states, the right to energy assets goes to whoever can ensure their physical control. Turkey has realized that without military presence, economic agreements remain only on paper. While other players, like Russian companies, weigh risks, Ankara acts—and acts systematically, building a chain from military influence to economic infrastructure. Over the past three years, it has not only returned to the region but has actively participated in its reconstruction—by its own rules. Let's list Turkey's key regional projects.

Development Road. A $17 billion project—a railroad from Turkey to the Persian Gulf through Iraq, intended to become an alternative to the Suez Canal. Ankara is already coordinating financing through Qatar's QNB and planning cargo launch in 2025. Key bonus: Iraqi oil will flow through the Turkish port of Ceyhan, bypassing traditional routes.
Libya. Turkish companies are restoring Tripoli airport ($120 million), reconstructing hospitals and universities. Military presence ensures access to resources: in 2024, Turkey signed an agreement on shelf field exploration worth $8 to $12 billion.
Syria. Country reconstruction follows the Turkish scenario. Projects worth $15-20 billion are being implemented, over 200 factories opened in industrial zones. Result—control over 35% of Syrian territory and key trade routes.

This expansion occurs amid internal turbulence: the lira lost 80% of its value over five years, and inflation reached 85% in 2022, creating significant currency risks for long-term projects. The change of six Central Bank chairpersons in recent years reflects difficulties in maintaining macroeconomic stability. However, this does not stop regional strategy implementation. According to official data, in 2025 alone Turkish companies concluded construction and infrastructure contracts worth about $560 million. Turkey has no loud export ideology—its advantage became working agreements and flexible strategy that proved effective under chaos conditions.

European Pragmatism: How to Turn Sanctions into a Business Plan
European businesses do not waste time figuring out who controls the regional economy—it Electric implement large-scale infrastructure projects in partnership with local military corporations. In Iran, despite sanctions, about 60 German companies operate in key sectors: petrochemicals, mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals. Volkswagen operates through the local partner Mammut Khodro, Siemens through regional channels, and Schneider Electric uses the Telemecanique Iran brand.
Private initiatives are reliably supported by government programs. The Global Gateway initiative budget is €26.7 billion in 2024 and €18.1 billion for 2025. The European Investment Bank provides guarantees for the decarbonization of Egyptian economy, and the French AFD finances the digitalization of air traffic control in Alexandria. Meanwhile, the re-export mechanism is refined to automation: products are delivered to Dubai, where they are repackaged and labeled before shipment to Tehran. Violations are formally recorded, fines issued—but deliveries continue without interruption.
The main paradox is that the architects of sanctions are first to find workarounds. In periods of changing global rules, the winners are not those who proclaim principles the loudest, but those who work quietly and effectively with reality.

Anatomy of Business Risks in Post-Western MENA
Business in the MENA region faces fundamentally new types of risks. Traditional Western instruments—insurance, hedging, due diligence—often prove ineffective here.
Institutional complexity. State bodies, military corporations, religious institutions, and tribal councils may simultaneously operate at one point. Each system functions according to its own logic, and obtaining approvals requires navigation between competing power centers. Rules can change retroactively, and jurisdictions can overlap in the most unpredictable ways.
Economic instability. Currency and debt crises often follow one another. State budgets depend on commodity exports and external aid, while infrastructure financing halts in response to any external shock. Banking transactions are conducted through alternative payment mechanisms, from cryptocurrencies to Islamic finance.
Geopolitical conflicts. One regional incident can nullify decades of investment. Sanctions and export restrictions transform trade into a multi-layered scheme, where each new layer is an additional access price. Contracts signed within interstate agreements can be revised in favor of new power alignments.

Major powers' geopolitical interests are increasingly realized not through public diplomacy but through private channels. For instance, during Donald Trump's negotiations with several African leaders in July, discussions focused not on humanitarian issues but on schemes for accessing mineral resources in exchange for weapons and logistics. Such formats can easily be projected onto MENA countries, where the struggle for resources has long exceeded formalized frameworks.
This changes the very nature of GR strategies. Instead of managing formalized risks, the priority becomes understanding real, not declared, decision-making mechanisms, seeing non-obvious centers of influence and their interaction. We are talking not about theoretical models but daily practice of those operating within the system and thinking in post-Western reality logic.

New Generation GR: When History Becomes a Business Asset
The main paradox of modernity is that at the very moment when contextual expertise becomes critically important, we observe a systemic crisis. Contemporary education increasingly produces specialists who have never visited their specialty countries and do not speak the local languages. This is not a random malfunction but a consequence of the narrowing of academic field and the loss of classical research standards. This approach undermines the very ability to think in contextual categories, without which understanding the logic of regional decision-making is impossible. The result is predictable: Western companies, relying on formal schemes, invest billions and suffer defeat after defeat. In a region where one wrong dialogue can close doors for years, and a single correct contact can open access to markets, this mistake becomes fatal.
Here, Russian business possesses a unique advantage unattainable for the West: an extensive network of Soviet and Russian university graduates today occupies key positions in economies and governments of MENA countries. From senior civil servants to heads of industrial giants—thousands of graduates from MGIMO, MSU, RUDN, and other universities make decisions in the region. This is ready-made influence infrastructure, created over decades.

Analysis of three adaptation models—Egypt's institutional duality, Iran's technological autonomy, and Turkey's military-economic expansion—reveals a common pattern. Success in MENA is determined not by knowledge of formal procedures but by understanding real decision-making mechanisms. Military corporations, the IRGC, pragmatic diplomacy—all these informal institutions require specific interaction skills.
The new GR paradigm is built on the ability to work with real, not declared, centers of influence. The temporary window for occupying this niche is limited: the Western expertise crisis is systemic, but competitors are already actively filling the vacuum.
History clearly demonstrates that crises become growth points for those who can see opportunities in contradictions of themselves. Today's era of change is not unique in this sense; only the scales and instruments have changed. While the majority focuses on obvious risks, a dialectical approach allows for engagement with the very nature of transformations. Practice confirms that regions in crisis offer maximum opportunities for those who understand their internal logic. It is no coincidence that the most dynamic projects today are implemented precisely at points of greatest tension—from Egyptian military corporations to Iranian technological clusters. This understanding transforms apparent obstacles into growth instruments—a principle that has repeatedly proven effective in working with the most complex jurisdictions.

¹ The theory of American sociologist Wallerstein ‘world-system’ is a neo-Marxist model that explains the causes of global inequality and describes the international order from the perspective of the dependence of ‘periphery’ and "’emi-periphery’ states (least developed and developing countries) on ‘core’ states (the ‘global West’)//Diplomatic Dictionary.